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ESSAY
CAN ATTEMPTED SEIZURES BE UNREASONABLE?: APPLYING
THE LAW OF ATTEMPT TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 1988, Hodari and some of his friends were standing by a
small red car, that was parked along the curb.' A couple of police officers pa-
trolling the area in a squad car saw the four young black males. When the
boys noticed the officers approaching, they ran away While one of the offi-
cers got out of the car to give chase, the other drove around the block after
them. While running away, Hodari, with one of the officers almost upon
him, pitched aside a bag of crack cocaine to the street." Just then, the officer
tackled and handcuffed him.5
At the time of California v. Hodari D., flight alone was not sufficient
reasonable suspicion to justify the stopping of the young men by the offi-
cers.6 Therefore, apprehending Hodari merely for running away from the of-
ficers would have constituted an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Stopping Hodari in this case, however, was not an
unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because
once Hodari tossed the drugs-which were recognized as such by the pursu-
ing officer-the officer then had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop
him. 7
1. See Brief for Respondent at 2, California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1990).
2. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-623 (1991).
3. Id. at 623.
4. ld.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 624 n.1 (stating that the lower court conceded that the officer did not have the
required reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Hodari). See also Illinois v. Wardlow, 120
S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (holding that presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking coupled
with unprovoked flight upon noticing the police is enough to support a reasonable suspicion
that the person is committing a crime). Wardlow, however, does not make it clear whether
unprovoked flight alone will justify stopping a person as the majority concluded that "deter-
mination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior." Id. Thus, there are still situations where an officer could unjustifiably
chase a person, as with Hodari.
7. See Hodari, 499 U.S. at 624 (stating there would be reasonable suspicion for the un-
questioned seizure that occurred when the officer tackled Hodari, only if the officer recog-
nized the crack cocaine as such).
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Hodari illustrates how an officer's attempt to unreasonably seize a per-
son can ultimately be viewed as reasonable. In other words, what began as
unlawful police conduct became reasonable, and therefore lawful, as soon as
Hodari tossed the drugs.' It is precisely this type of contradiction that is the
focus of this Essay. Specifically, this Essay closely analyzes the problem
posed by, and potential legal response to, attempted unlawful seizures. Part I
of this Essay will discuss the Hodari case and its implications for the rela-
tion between the law of remedies and police attempts to violate the Fourth
Amendment. Part II then takes up the substantive criminal law's notion of
attempted criminality, its elements, purpose, and punishment. Part II also
demonstrates why the law of attempt should (though it currently does not)
apply to attempted seizures. Part III addresses two concerns: why suppres-
sion of evidence obtained via an attempted unjustified seizure is the appro-
priate remedy; and why civil remedies can do little if anything to remedy at-
tempted unjustified seizures.
I. HODARI: HOW POLICE SUCCEED BY TRYING AND FAILING
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
"[t]he right of the people to be secure... against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Because the Fourth Amendment only applies when there is a
search or seizure, it is important to determine when a search or seizure oc-
curs."0 Once it is determined that a search or seizure has occurred, the next
question is whether the search or seizure is reasonable." Whether a search or
seizure is reasonable depends on whether there is sufficient justification for
the police officer's actions. 2
In Hodari, the majority held that because Hodari did not submit to the
officer's show of authority, he "was not seized until he was tackled."' 3 The
Court also held that since Hodari abandoned the cocaine while he was run-
ning, that is, before being seized, it was not a fruit of the seizure." If, how-
ever, the Fourth Amendment intends to prevent police from abusing their
power, then relying on whether a suspect submits to an official show of au-
thority, e.g. a police chase, should not determine whether the police officer's
conduct was justified. An officer's abuse of power should not be legitimized
by circumstances out of the officer's control, such as whether a suspect de-
cides to turn himself in.
8. See Califoniav. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
10. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Ho-
dari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRim. L. REV. 799, 800 (1991) (explaining why the definition of
seizure is of crucial importance to deciding cases in court and in guiding police officers in
determining how they may permissibly interact with citizens).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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The Fourth Amendment exists to protect against invasions of autonomy.
More specifically, it prohibits unreasonable searches or seizures by govern-
ment actors, regardless of whether the person who is searched or seized turns
out to be guilty. 5 The lawfulness of the government's actions is measured by
the sufficiency of the government actor's suspicions or knowledge about the
suspect before the search or seizure, not by what is produced by the search
or seizure. The courts enforce the Fourth Amendment primarily though not
wholly with the exclusionary remedy, which provides that when a search or
seizure is deemed unreasonable, the government is penalized by the exclu-
sion of all evidence obtained from the unreasonable action.6 This judicially
created remedy is designed to safeguard a citizen's Fourth Amendment
rights" by prohibiting use of the evidence against the defendant at trial,
where police expect to obtain a conviction based on the illegally-obtained
evidence produced by the search or seizure. In this way, the exclusionary
remedy is meant to deter police from performing unreasonable seizures by
depriving them of their anticipated gain. The remedy therefore is meant to
improve official investigatory techniques by ensuring a high cost to police
and prosecutors for reckless and careless policing.8
The exclusionary remedy, however, does not apply to attempted sei-
zures. Hodari held that a seizure does not take place unless the subject sub-
mits to a police show of authority. 9 In other words, the arbitrary actions of
police officers-like chasing Hodari--do not require justification because
there was no seizure under the Fourth Amendment until after police tackled
Hodari upon observing him discard the drugs while fleeing."
Requiring that a person submit to a show of authority in order for a sei-
zure to take place creates situations where police can violate procedure with-
out facing any consequences. For example, if a racist police officer chases an
individual solely because he is black, successful capture of the suspect is an
illegal seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment. But if the suspect
somehow eludes capture, then no seizure occurs and the very same behavior
remains to an extent invisible because it will require no justification by the
officer as to why he was chasing the suspect.2' By requiring submission to
15. See John B. Owens, Judge Baer and the Politics of the Fourth Amendment: An Alter-
native to Bad Man Jurisprudence, 8 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REv. 189, 192 (1997) (stating that
Judge Brennan, as well as Justice Harlan, viewed the purpose of the Fourth Amendment simi-
larly, describing it as not designed to be a shelter for criminals, but a basic protection for eve-
ryone).
16. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961).
17. Richard Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Consti-
tutional Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REv. 501, 506 (1982).
18. ld. at 504-06.
19. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
20. See Richard W. Zahn, California v. Hodari D.: An Evolving Definitions of Seizure
Under the Fourth Amendment, 27 NEw ENG. L. REv. 447,465 (1992).
21. See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145, 187
(1993) (illustrating with examples why the fourth amendment's coverage should not turn
upon an individual's success or failure in eluding the police).
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authority for a completed seizure, police officers may now shoot at an inno-
cent citizen and the officers' behavior would be beyond the coverage of the
Fourth Amendment as long as they miss their target.' Or even worse, offi-
cers could hit their target and not implicate the Fourth Amendment as long
as the target was hearty enough to continue to flee. Furthermore, government
agents may now enter an airport, draw their guns, announce a "baggage
search" (a search they have no authority to compel), and if the passengers
refuse to submit to police authority and walk away, then police have done
nothing objectionable, at least not in the eyes of the law.'
In each of these examples, officers attempt an unlawful seizure but fail.
Because submission to authority is required, the officers' conduct is beyond
the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, no matter how outrageous or cor-
ruptly motivated that conduct may be.' Such a state of affairs hardly com-
ports with the exclusionary remedy's purpose, which is to encourage police
to conform to the Fourth Amendment's commands. If a happy outcome (get-
ting evidence to use against a fleeing suspect) can cure an otherwise unjusti-
fied action (trying to seize someone when you have no right to do so), then
the law is giving police a mixed message about the consequences that flow
from putting themselves to searching or seizing without sufficient justifica-
tion. Indeed, if the purpose of the exclusionary remedy is to deter improper
behavior by law enforcement officers.' then it should dictate how police
must operate independent of a citizen's reaction to such misbehavior. 6 Ac-
cordingly, if deterrence is the goal, a penalty should exist for attempted sei-
zures just as a penalty exists under the criminal law for would-be criminals
who put themselves to crime but, for one reason or another, fail.
II. THE LAW OF ATrEMPT
Since the law of criminal attempt holds a person responsible for
attempting to commit a crime, then it follows that a police officer should be
responsible for attempting to violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights.'
By deterring only actual seizures, police can still attempt unreasonable sei-
zures." Attempted unreasonable seizures are undesirable not only because
police could pursue suspects aggressively (with the "intent" to fail in the
22. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. lId at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Id at 646.
25. lId; Zahn, supra note 20, at 466.
26. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27. Bacigal, supra note 21, at 203 (drawing upon established concepts used in defining
attempted crimes, an area of the law requiring "a judicial determination as to whether the ac-
tor's conduct imposes upon society certain undesirable consequences that our legal system
seeks to prohibit").
28. See Randolph Peidrahita, A Conservative Court Says "Goodbye to All That" and
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hope of recovering incriminating evidence without implicating the Fourth
Amendment29), but also because it is undesirable to set themselves at all to
pursue a course of unconstitutional action.
Most American jurisdictions have enacted statutes to protect citizens
against attempted criminal offenses.3" An attempt, as described in the Model
Penal Code, requires an act constituting a substantial step toward committing
a crime that is "strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose."' The
dual purpose behind attempt laws is both to deter people from committing
crimes and also to reform a person who was either unsuccessful in commit-
ting or attempting to commit a criminal act." Law enforcement must inter-
vene whenever possible to prevent a person from committing the intended
crime.33 Moreover, a failure to complete a crime on a particular occasion
may present a continuing danger that the person will succeed in the next at-
tempt.' Punishment, therefore, is appropriate to deter the criminal defendant
from engaging in dangerous conduct, as well as to enable the police to pro-
tect society by incarcerating the defendant.35
People are held criminally responsible for their criminal actions and do
not escape punishment merely because the intended result did not occur.36
Although criminal liability should not rely on matters out of the agent's con-
trol, most sentencing codes and guidelines treat attempts more leniently than
their corresponding completed crimes.37 The fact that attempts are typically,
though not always,3" treated more leniently than completed crimes implies
that failure provides a partial excuse. In other words, when a person tries to
commit a crime but fails to do so for whatever reason, that person has a plea
for a partial excuse.39 Such failure, however, does not let the person com-
pletely evade responsibility.'
Whether failure should provide a partial excuse is debatable.4 ' The vast
majority of jurisdictions hold that, at least when it comes to the most serious
29. Id.
30. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 at 537 (3d ed. 2000).
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (West 1974 & Supp. 2000).
32. See LAFAVE, supra note 30, at 538.
33. Id. at 539.
34. Id.
35. Ud
36. See Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive
Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 117, 125 (1995); MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (West
1974 & Supp. 2000).
37. See Feinberg, supra note 36, at 121.
38. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.05 (West 1974 & Supp. 2000).
39. See Daniel B. Yeager, Inchoate Criminality 4 (Dec. 1998) (unpublished manuscript
on file with author) (arguing to re-characterize inchoate criminality as a plea for a partial ex-
cuse subject to less stringent punishment than completed crimes).
40. See id.
41. See Bacigal, supra note 21, at 208-11. Bacigal explains the difference between the
subjectivist and objectivist view on how to treat attempts. Subjectivists maintain that "classi-
fying attempts as crimes 'provides the state with an opportunity to isolate and punish danger-
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offenses, there should be a difference in degrees of punishment between at-
tempted and completed crimes. These jurisdictions argue that the harmful
result is an indication of bad intentions, but absent a harmful result, there is
not enough evidence to justify criminal liability to its fullest." Attempts may
fail for a number of reasons and the causal explanation for failure could be
more than external intervention; instead, failure could be due to a partial
withholding of will or an ambivalence of motive.43 For example, a would-be
thief may be insufficiently committed to the actual crime for his theft to suc-
ceed, perhaps because of his internal conflict about being a thief (which in
turn perhaps contributes to his being apprehended). Punishing attempts more
leniently than completed crimes, therefore, can be justified by the uncer-
tainty of the precise explanation of why an attempt failed. 4
Others, though far fewer in number, believe there should not be a differ-
ence in punishment between attempted and completed crimes, and instead
argue the intended result may have little to do with the blameworthiness of
the intended action.45 The difference in liability between attempts and com-
pleted crimes should be eliminated, they argue, because criminal liability in-
volves dangerous persons and such persons are dangerous whether or not the
harm they intend ultimately occurs.' A popular example that expresses this
position is known as "equivalency." Equivalency is where two people intend
to commit the same crime but, all other factors being equal, one fails due to
external circumstances, such as where the would-be murderer's gunshot is
deflected by a bird or the victim's cigarette case.4 The argument runs, there-
fore, that this chance failure should not justify a difference in liability be-
tween the two equally determined and dangerous persons because the fact
that the same action led to different consequences means that sentencing is
relying on luck rather than actual culpability.48 "Indeed, exculpation of those
ous persons who subjectively intend to cause social harm."' Id. at 208. Objectivists, on the
other hand, would "withhold censure until the conduct has brought about some harmful con-
sequence." Id. at 210. The subjectivist, therefore, views the Fourth Amendment as a device
for regulating conduct intended to bring about a constitutionally prohibited harm and con-
cludes there would be no need to wait for the actual infringement upon liberty to occur be-
cause legal sanctions for attempts seek to prevent future harm; the objectivists would invoke
legal sanctions against conduct which damages some interest deemed socially valuable. Id.
42. See Barbara Herman, Feinberg on Luck and Failed Attempts, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 143,
145-46 (1995).
43. Id. at 145.
44. Id. at 146.
45. Kimberly D. Kessler, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
2183, 2194 (1994).
46. See Daniel M. Mandil, Chance, Freedom, and Criminal Liability, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
125, 129 (1987).
47. Feinberg, supra note 36, at 118.
48. Id. at 119; Mandil, supra note 46, at 129. But see Herman, supra note 42, at 147-49
(arguing that success of our actions being contingent on factors outside our control is insuffi-
cient as a basis for explanations of those actions, and distinguishing failed attempts from suc-
cessful actions may not involve anything morally arbitrary).
[Vol. 37432
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who fail due to a fortuity would involve inequality of treatment that would
shock the common sense of justice."49
While there is some support for punishing attempts equivalently to
completed offenses, such support is rare, and no legislature adheres to this
ideology without at least some exceptions. Although the purpose of
criminalizing attempts is deterrence and a harmful consequence is not
required for guilt, the fact that attempts tend to be treated more leniently than
completed crimes strongly suggests that failure does provide a partial ex-
cuse.
III. ATTEMPTED SEIZURES AND THE QUESTION OF REMEDY
If the law of criminal attempt holds a person responsible for attempting
to commit a crime, then the law of criminal procedure should hold law en-
forcers responsible for attempting to violate someone's Fourth Amendment
rights. When an officer attempts to violate someone's Fourth Amendment
rights, the same penalty should apply to failed violations as well as to com-
pleted ones.' The bad intention may misfire or fall short, but, just as with
criminal attempts, a remedy is nonetheless appropriate in order to deter fu-
ture wrongdoing-even attempted wrongdoing.
The two settings--criminal law and criminal procedure-are not, how-
ever, identical. While failure to commit the crime provides a partial excuse
for criminal defendants, police should not have a partial excuse available to
them because the only available remedy for attempted unconstitutional sei-
zures is exclusion of the evidence. That is, the idea of partial excuse makes
no sense in the context of attempted unconstitutional seizures. Sentences un-
der criminal law are incremental or gradual, while under criminal procedure
they cannot be. A sentence can be reduced, but evidentiary exclusion is bi-
nary: exclusion operates or it does not. There is no middle ground. There-
fore, because the officer in Hodari attempted to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment by attempting an unlawful seizure, the cocaine should have been
suppressed in order to deter that very kind of police misconduct.
Although exclusion of evidence is the appropriate remedy in cases in-
volving police misconduct, when there is no evidence to exclude, the exclu-
sionary remedy provides no relief to those individuals subjected to police
misconduct."' When there is no evidence, the only other option for a person
subjected to police misconduct is to seek a civil remedy that compensates
victims of such misconduct and deters future abuse.5" Unfortunately, there is
not much incentive for such a person, innocent or not, to bring a civil law-
suit." Section 1983 of the United States Code is the primary remedy for the
49. LAFAVE, supra note 30, at 539.
50. See Peidrahita, supra note 28, at 1334.
51. Owens, supra note 15, at 192.
52. Matthew V. Hess, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal Remedies for Police
Misconduct, UTAH L. REV. 149, 152 (1993).
53. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE 7
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vindication of civil rights.' Section 1983 allows citizens to sue in federal
court to enforce their civil rights against state and local police officers
(among others) who deprive them of their constitutional and other federally
guaranteed rights.5 A Bivens action is a comparable suit that allows private
citizens to initiate a federal action against federal officers who deprive them
of certain constitutional rights, including the right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures!' Both section 1983 and Bivens suits allow citi-
zens to seek redress in federal court when their constitutional rights have
been violated by law enforcement officials.'
Police officers can raise qualified immunity as a defense if the law is not
clearly established or, even if it is, if the officer reasonably believed that he
or she was acting lawfully. 8 When an officer properly raises qualified im-
munity as a defense, the officer is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court 9 Moreover, one cannot bring an action against the State because the
Supreme Court has held that a State is not a "person" within the meaning of
section 1983 and states have not consented to such suits.' Additionally, an
action against a municipality or county, which are treated as persons for
purposes of section 1983, will succeed only if the constitutional deprivation
resulted from the official policy or custom of the defendant entity.6' Munici-
palities and counties cannot assert qualified immunity as a defense,62 but nei-
ther are they subject to punitive damages.'
Certainly, a qualified-immunity defense impedes the plaintiff,' since of-
ficials who perform their public duties reasonably (though unlawfully) are
not subject to personal liability for money damages.' If the court accepts the
officer's claim of qualified immunity, then the only claim the plaintiff may
have is against the municipality or county. The fact that local government
entities can be sued only if they authorized the individual officer's action
through a government policy or custom, however, can make a section 1983
lawsuit difficult for plaintiffs. It is of little surprise that less than half of one
INVESTIGATION 555-565 (1998). Criminal action and administrative remedies exist but are
useless because criminal actions against police officers and administrative remedies are rarely
instituted. See id.
54. Hess, supra note 52, at 152-53.
55. William Hawkins, Section 1983: A Basic Understanding, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc.
355, 356-57 (1988); H. Mitchell Caldwell et. al., If It's Broken, Fix it: Moving Beyond the Ex-
clusionary Rule, 83 IowA L. REv. 669, 740 (1998).
56. Owens, supra note 15, at 193.
57. Daniel J. McDonald, A Primer on 42 U.S.C. '1983, UTAH B.J. 29 (May 12, 1999).
58. See Hawkins, supra note 55, at 365.
59. See McDonald, supra note 57, at 32.
60. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,71 (1989).
61. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
62. Id. at 701.
63. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
64. See Hess, supra note 52, at 158.
65. See Creighton v. Anderson, 922 F.2d 443, 448 (1990).
[Vol. 37
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percent of all section 1983 suits, at least those filed by prisoners, elicit any
damage awards at all.'
Plaintiffs also are hindered in a section 1983 or Bivens lawsuit because
they often result in small actual damages. 7 Often suspects suffer no physical
injury or emotional trauma when police detain them too long, or rummage
through their belongings and find nothing, or otherwise subject plaintiffs to
their authority in a relatively minor way (minor at least when compared to
the sort of tort suits that yield substantial damages). Put slightly differently, a
real hindrance to the success of civil-rights lawsuits is that they are viewed
largely as just another form of tort action, where damages, if only due to the
legal system's lack of remedial imagination, get expressed merely in terms
of bumps, bruises, and emotional trauma.
While section 1983 compensates injuries caused by a constitutional dep-
rivation," the Supreme Court is hore than a little reluctant to "presume"
damages from the "abstract" value of a constitutional right.' Perhaps due to
a lack of imagination, or an inability to view the right at stake as more valu-
able than the physical or emotional injury suffered by its violation, it is not
unusual for a court or jury to find a constitutional violation, yet decline to
order compensation as a remedy. Did the plaintiff lose sleep? Income? Why,
exactly? Because someone performed a religious prayer at a graduation pro-
gram in a public school? Indeed, plaintiffs have gotten all the way to the Su-
preme Court only to have the Court agree that their constitutional rights were
violated or ignored by the government, and then order the government to pay
the plaintiff as little as $1 in damages for violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment70 and little more for violations of the First Amendment.7! ' Such
instances where nominal damages are awarded to plaintiffs who substantiate
constitutional violations but fail to establish the factual basis for an award of
compensatory damages, although far from common, do indeed occurY
The availability of punitive damages does not make matters much better
for plaintiffs. Punitive damages are available against individual officials who
are sued under section 1983, but only in the mat obvious and egregious
cases, e.g. Rodney King's. Such damages are never available against local
governments, who, ironically, are in a much better position than the tortfea-
66. BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGING THE
CONDrrIONS OF PRISONS AND JAMS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 17-22, 36 (Jan.
1995) (Discussion Paper).
67. McDonald, supra note 57, at 33.
68. Memphis Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 447 U.S. 299, 307 (1986).
69. See id. at 310.
70. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992). See also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247,266 (1978).
71. See Abramson v. Anderson, 50 U.S.L.W. 2462 (S.D. Iowa 1982). In Abramson,
plaintiff was awarded $300 for mental distress caused by authorized prayers at student assem-
blies. Id. See also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 186 (1994).
72. See Stachura, 447 U.S. at 308 n.1; McDonald, supra note 57, at 33.
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sor-officer to both pay punitive damages and minimize the re-occurrence of
violations through improved recruitment, supervision, and officer training.73
These civil-rights lawsuits are also costly to litigate.74 Although prevail-
ing plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees," the Supreme Court
has held that if a "plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his
failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the
only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all."76 Because section 1983 and
Bivens lawsuits depend on private enforcement, the availability of at least
attorney's fees awards is necessary to supply greater incentive to bring such
actions."
Individual officers, however, are not necessarily concerned with attor-
neys' fees or with paying judgments. For instance, assume that the City of
San Diego keeps lawyers on retainer to defend police officers, whether on or
off duty at the time of the tort in question. The City then privately contracts
with individual officers to provide the officers representation and indemnifi-
cation as long as the action complained of occurs within the scope of em-
ployment. Only grossly negligent acts, such as rape, fall outside of the scope
of employment and even then the City will represent the defendant through
the administrative-hearing stage of litigation. The City will not, however,
cover punitive damages.7" Because the City has more money to spend on
lawsuits than do plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lawyers, plaintiffs' lawyers will not
expend sufficient time and money on the case due to their concern that their
reasonable fee, to which they are entitled if they win, may be no fee at all in
the typical small-damages case. This unequal playing field substantially hin-
ders the plaintiff before and during trial.
In addition, when the plaintiff does get to court against an individual of-
ficer, the jury often sees the officers as merely "doing their job" and sympa-
thizes with them on the question of the officer's liability. Moreover, jurors
and judges alike can be biased against a former criminal defendant-now
turned plaintiff-not only because of the base criminality, but also because
they view them as unworthy victims. This is particularly so under rules that
admit evidence that was discovered against the defendant, even though that
evidence is inadmissible in the criminal case.8
73. McDonald, supra note 57, at 33.
74. See Caldwell et. al., supra note 55, at 740.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1999).
76. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit lim-
ited Farrar's holding to cases where there is a significant difference between the amount re-
covered and the amount sought, the legal issue is of little significance, and no important pub-
lic purpose is being served. Id. at 121-22 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. Hess, supra note 52, at 164.
78. Telephone Interview with Tom Simones, Police Officer for the City of San Diego,
Police Department in San Diego, Cal. (Apr. 4, 2000).
79. See Owens, supra note 15, at 194.
80. See id; Caldwell, et. al., supra note 55, at 739-40.
[Vol. 37
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Potential plaintiffs, therefore, have little incentive to sue for damages
for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights because of the difficulty in
obtaining effective legal representation and the absence of a prospect of a
significant recovery. Consequently, there is no reason to believe civil law-
suits act as an effective deterrent.8 Due to the problems inherent in civil
remedies, the exclusionary remedy should be applied whenever possible.
Suppression of such evidence should be sought when evidence is obtained
through an unlawful attempted seizure.
Although other attempted constitutional violations should require a pen-
alty to serve as a deterrent, the exclusionary remedy would be inapplicable
because there is no evidence to exclude. It is only in situations where there is
no evidence to exclude, that civil remedies should be sought, or at least
solely depended on.
For instance, when a police officer conducts a custodial interrogation
and fails to properly warn the subject, the officer has violated Miranda. Any
confessions obtained from the misconduct will be suppressed at trial. 2 An
attempted Miranda violation would involve the same police misconduct but
either would not lead to a confession or would lead to a confession that the
prosecution does not seek to introduce at trial (if there is one). Because in
such a case there is no evidence to suppress, the exclusionary remedy cannot
apply and the only option left is to bring a civil action against the offending
officer. 3 In this situation, the small-damages problem becomes even worse
given that suspects whose Miranda rights are violated are lawfully arrested;
their only complaint is not that they were in custody, but that police talked to
them. Because it is hard to see a question as a tort, only the tiniest minority
of courts have identified section 1983 suits as the appropriate means for the
vindication of the Miranda rights.
Similarly, when an officer conducts an unreasonable search by invading
an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy, any evidence obtained will
be suppressed at trial. An attempted search would involve the same unrea-
sonable conduct, but would not lead to any evidence. Because no evidence
results from an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary remedy could not apply.'
It would be "damages or nothing" for the plaintiff-search victim.' And fi-
nally, while an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure results in
exclusion of the out-of-court identification at trial, the exclusionary remedy
will not apply to an attempted impermissibly suggestive identification that
81. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 36-37 (3d ed. 1996).
82. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
83. See California Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 1999 WL 1005103, 11 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that officers who intentionally violate Miranda are not entitled to qualified
immunity and are subject to civil liability).
84. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133-35 (1942).
85. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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does not lead to an identification. 6 Clearly, the exclusionary remedy is not a
plausible remedy in such a case. Some remedy, however, is still necessary in
such a case for the same reasons it is necessary for attempted seizures. Al-
though section 1983 and Bivens lawsuits act as a less effective deterrent than
the exclusionary remedy, they are the only other penalties available when the
exclusionary remedy is not. Because the exclusionary remedy is available
when there is evidence to suppress, it is the appropriate remedy when an of-
ficer discovers evidence in an attempt to unlawfully seize someone.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has decided not to treat attempted seizures as a form
of seizure and, consequently, attempted seizures do not provide citizens with
the adequate protection that the Fourth Amendment was intended to provide.
If preventing an officer's unlawful conduct is the focus, then a citizen's re-
sponse to that conduct should not be a factor in determining whether a pen-
alty should exist for the already unlawful conduct. The logic here parallels
the logic for holding people responsible for attempting to commit crimes. In
seeking to prevent criminal behavior, most American jurisdictions provide a
penalty for those who attempt such misconduct. Therefore, it follows that if
officers are penalized for conducting unlawful seizures, attempts at such
misconduct should be penalized as well.
The exclusionary remedy provides the best penalty and should be used
in all cases where evidence is available to suppress and that has been ob-
tained illegally. The fact that the exclusionary remedy is not a viable remedy
for other attempted constitutional violations does not mean that it should be
precluded in cases where it can apply. Therefore, in instances of attempted
seizures where there is evidence to be excluded, suppression is the proper
remedy.
Alyssa Saks*
86. Daniel Yeager, "Oops!" Inadvertence, Intentionality and the Police, 24 SEARCH AND
SEIZuRE L. REP. 157, 160 (1997).
"J.D. California Western School of Law, 2001. B.A. Communication Studies, University of
California, at Santa Barbara, 1996. I would like to thank Professor Yeager for all his help;




California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/7
